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INTRODUCTION
On September 9, 2003, Tani Downing, Petitioner Lorin Blauer's supervisor - in
retaliation for Mr. Blauer's successful challenge to her "unsuccessful" job rating "reassigned" Mr. Blauer to hold administrative hearings full time. He was the only
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III employed by the State of Utah to be so singled out.
Ms. Downing openly and admittedly based Mr. Blauer's "reassignment" on job
performance issues and alleged failures - effectively a disciplinary / corrective action which, to this day, Mr. Blauer contends, and is willing and able to prove, are completely
groundless. Moreover, the "reassignment" was to tasks which, as Ms. Downing well
knew, Mr. Blauer could not perform by reason of disability. Any attempt to perform this
particular set of duties would exacerbate his disabilities to the point of making him
incapable of working at all. Ms. Downing effectively ended his career.
Since September 9, 2003, Mr. Blauer has attempted to obtain a hearing on
Ms. Downing's accusations and actions. He appealed the "reassignment" to Department
of Workforce Services (DWS) Executive Director Raylene Ireland, who concluded that
Mr. Blauer had no grounds to challenge the "reassignment" - even though it was clearly a
disciplinary action based on unsubstantiated allegations of performance deficiencies, and
entailed job duties which he was physically and psychologically unable to perform (R. 27149 at Attachment 26). Mr. Blauer then appealed to the State Career Service Review
Board (CSRB), only to be told that it declined jurisdiction over his claims (R. 20-26).
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Mr. Blauer petitioned for reconsideration of this decision (R. 27-149); CSRB declined to
reconsider. Mr. Blauer then filed the 2004 action before the Third Judicial District Court
(Civil No. 040900221; still pending), challenging his "reassignment" on various grounds,
including demotion and rule violations. At the same time, he filed a complaint before the
Anti-Discrimination & Labor Division of the Utah State Industrial Commission,
challenging his "reassignment" on the additional basis of the ADA and the UADA. In
motion practice before the court in the 2004 action, Judge Leslie Lewis determined that
Mr. Blauer had not been "demoted" by his "reassignment"; she found, however, that
CSRB had improperly declined jurisdiction of Mr. Blauer's remaining claims - including
rule violations specifically invoking standards established by the ADA - and remanded
them to the CSRB.
This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling on appeal, yet CSRB took no action on
the remanded issues for many months. During the interim, Mr. Blauer sought judicial
review of DWS' actions under ADA and UADA before the Third District Court - only to
be told that the Americans With Disabilities Act did not apply to Utah State employees
(even though he had been repeatedly advised to invoke ADA remedies, and even though
DWS employed an ADA coordinator to which Mr. Blauer was repeatedly referred
without success - R. 27-149 at Attachment 24)1. At this juncture, CSRB again ruled that

^ W S perpetuates this conundrum even now by insisting that employees file a
complaint with UALD if their complaint involves ADA issues.
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it had no jurisdiction over Mr. Blauer's remaining claims expressly remanded by Third
District Court for determination (R. 659-670); this time, however, CSRB labeled its
decision as the product of a "formal adjudicative proceeding", thus attempting to deprive
the Third Judicial District Court of jurisdiction to enforce its own order of remand in the
2004 action, and directing any petition for relief to this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16.
Through all of this, DWS demonstrates a consistent, divide-and-concur strategy:
breaking the case into as many pieces as possible, eliminating Mr. Blauer's attempts to
obtain a hearing on the merits by invoking a series of procedural tripwires; stretching
favorable rulings over as much ground as possible; and side-stepping the jurisdiction of
the Third District Court where rulings are not favorable. Before delving into the merits
of DWS' arguments in this appeal, it bears noting that DWS' procedural gyrations in this
entire matter have utterly subverted the clear legislative policy and purpose underlying the
grievance procedures set out at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-101, et seq.\ the simple,
prompt resolution of public employee grievances on their merits. As punishment for
having challenged the validity of his supervisor's unlawful acts, Lorin Blauer has been
plunged into a four-year procedural quagmire, and has yet to be heard by a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits of his claims. It is difficult to imagine that the Utah
legislature intended to equip the State's Department of Workforce Services with tools to
construct the procedural bramble bush demonstrated in this action, as a vehicle for
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defending its supervisors from having to answer for the consequences of their illegal
actions.
DWS' opposing brief in this appeal essentially raises two defenses: (1) CSRB's
December 6, 2006, decision dismissing the claims remanded to it by the Third District
Court in the 2004 action was the result of a "formal adjudicative proceeding" because
CSRB decided to label it as such; and (2) CSRB properly dismissed the remanded claims
because they were not fully articulated in Mr. Blauer's initial appeal of his "reassignment", but only in his Request for Reconsideration of its initial ruling. Neither claim has
any merit.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

A.

CSRB'S DECEMBER 6, 2006, RULING WAS NOT THE
RESULT OF A "FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDING"

Proceedings Before CSRB Did Not Qualify as "Formal Adjudicative
Proceedings" as Defined by Statute.

DWS first maintains that the December 6, 2006, ruling from CSRB, which
disregarded the Third District Court's Order of Remand and concluded, once again, that
CSRB lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. Blauer's claims of rule violation, etc., was a
"formal adjudicative proceeding" because CSRB so designated it (Opposing Brief at
p. 14-21). Even DWS acknowledges, however, that the enabling statute in this regard
does not enable CSRB - or any other administrative agency - to constitute a proceeding
"formal" or "informal" simply by appropriate labeling. Rather, the legislature has granted
808326v1
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to administrative agencies the authority to determine whether certain types of proceedings
will be conducted as informal or formal adjudicative proceedings - but in accordance
with statutory requirements:
The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings
to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules
enacted under the authority of this chapter if;
(a)
the use of the informal procedures does not violate any
procedural requirement imposed by a statute other than this chapter;
(b)
in the view of the agency, the rights of the parties to the
proceedings will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures;
(c)
in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative
efficiency will be enhanced by categorizations; and
(d)
the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the
potential benefits to the public of a formal adjudicative proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(l); emphasis added. Section 63-46b-4 then goes on to
provide (in relevant part) that "all agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically
designated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules shall be conducted formally in
accordance with the requirements of this chapter" - Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(2);
emphasis added. As noted at pages 27-29 of Petitioner's Opening Brief, CSRJB's
designation of its proceedings as "formal" controls nothing if the requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act are not met. Petitioner has already cited this Court to the
case of Lopez v. Career Service Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992) for the
proposition that, to be construed (and reviewable) as a "formal adjudicative proceeding",
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a proceeding before an administrative agency must meet the requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act.
Concerning DWS' accusation that Mr. Blauer "grossly misrepresents" proceedings
before CSRB upon remand in the 2004 action (Opposing Brief at p. 16), the Court is
referred to the record before it. The hearing officer prefaced her decision by observing
that "no witnesses appeared and no other evidence was received into the record other than
that which is already on file". (Opening Brief at Addendum 1, p. 1). Petitioner, then, was
given no opportunity to "present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination,
and submit rebuttal evidence" - Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(d). Unlike the Lopez
decision, CSRB's hearing in this matter did not permit the Petitioner to present evidence,
did not involve any stipulation by Petitioner that a written record would constitute
evidence in the matter - and in no way reached the merits of the claims expressly
remanded by the Third District Court in the 2004 action for resolution. It was a
jurisdictional rejection, precisely like the prior order reversed in the 2004 action.
B.

The Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Does Not Deprive This Court of
Jurisdiction to Determine the Character of the CSRB
Proceeding.

DWS' next argument concerning the formal vs. informal character of the CSRB
proceeding is unique. Without citing a single Utah case, DWS argues that the doctrine of
"issue preclusion" bars this Court from determining whether proceedings before the
CSRB were formal or informal, because a separate judge of the Third District Court has
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already made the decision for it. The argument, however, betrays a misunderstanding of
the nature of issue preclusion, as well as the nature of the proceeding before this Court.
Petitioner acknowledges that, at the same time he filed this petition, he also filed
an independent action before the Third Judicial District Court (Case No. 070900108)
seeking review of CSRB's December 6, 2006, ruling herein as the product of an
"informal adjudicative proceeding"; further, that by Order dated April 9, 2007,
Judge Joseph Fratto dismissed that 2007 action, concluding that CSRB's proceeding had
been a "formal adjudicative proceeding", and that the trial court therefore lacked subject
matter jurisdiction2. On the same day that the 2007 action was filed before Third District
Court, however, this Petition was filed, seeking this Court's original review of CSRB's
action, and challenging CSRB's characterization of the proceeding as a "formal
adjudicative proceeding". In short, the 2007 filing before the Third District Court, and
this proceeding, were both appeals simultaneously taken from the same ruling, seeking
alternate remedies depending upon whether CSRB's ruling was or was not the result of a
"formal adjudicative proceeding".
By DWS' own admission, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not operate as a
final adjudication on the merits of a claim (Opposing Brief at p. 13). This principle has
been repeatedly emphasized in recent litigation - see Remy v. Gonzales, 2007 WL

2

As noted in Petitioner's opening brief, the 2007 action was necessitated by the 30day appeal period under the APA, given that the Third District Court had not yet ruled
(and still has not yet ruled) on his Motion to Reconsider Order of Remand therein.
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2376777 (5th Cir. 2007); 8 Arlington Street, LLC v. Arlington Land Acquisition - 99, LLC,
2007 WL 2367753 (Mass. Super. 2007); John v. U.S., 2007 WL 2255149 (Fed. CI. 2007).
Under Utah law, issue preclusion only applies where "the first suit resulted in a final
judgment on the merits" - State v. Paolone, 2007 Utah App. 285, 2007 WL 2446485
(emphasis added). On this basis alone, "issue preclusion" may not deprive this Court of
the right to determine whether CSRB's decision was or was not the result of a "formal
adjudicative proceeding".
DWS' argument suffers a more fundamental failing, however. The doctrine of
"issue preclusion" was intended to bar re-litigation of identical issues in successive
proceedings before courts of similar jurisdiction. This is also implied in the decision of
State v. Paolone, cited supra, which states that "issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel,
'prevents parties or privies from re-litigating facts and issues in the second suit that were
fully litigated in the first suit" - 2007 Utah App. at 285 (emphasis added). For decisions
that are rendered by different courts as part of the same, ongoing proceeding, rules of
preclusion do not apply. This was made clear by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of
Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 120 S. Ct. 2304, 147 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2000). In that
action, the state of Arizona invoked the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
settle the dispute with California over the states' respective rights to use water from the
Colorado River system. The United States intervened, seeking to shelter water rights for
five Native American reservations. The Supreme Court issued its initial decision in the
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mid-1950s. Several decades later, two of the tribes involved in the prior Supreme Court
decision sought to contest water rights issues included within the Supreme Court's prior
determination. Despite the passage of time, the Supreme Court held the matter to
constitute "a single ongoing original action", in which "the technical rules of preclusion
are not strictly applicable" - 530 U.S. at 392.
This Petition was filed in tandem with the 2007 action before the Third District
Court, both with the same purpose: to challenge CSRB's rejection of the Third District
Court's directive, in the 2004 action (which has not been reduced to final judgment, and
remains pending) that it lacked jurisdiction over claims remanded in the 2004 action. It
was CSRB's December 6, 2006, decision which was the subject of both appeals. As
such, both appeals are part of a single, ongoing action challenging CSRB's ruling. The
purpose of "issue preclusion", which is avoidance of serial re-litigation of specific issues,
would not be served in such a situation.
At all events, the relief which Petitioner seeks through this action leads to the same
place regardless of the characterization of CSRB's administrative proceeding: remand to
Third District Court for a proper adjudication on the merits of the claims remanded by the
Third District Court to CSRB in the 2004 action.
POINT II.

PETITIONER'S REMANDED CLAIMS FROM THE
2004 ACTION WERE PROPERLY BEFORE CSRB.

DWS' remaining argument is that - Judge Lewis' ruling in the 2004 action
notwithstanding - the remanded claims were not properly before it, having not been
808326vl
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raised in Mr. Blauer's initial petition to CSRB with the same detail that they were set out
in his request for reconsideration. See Opposing Brief at pp. 21-27. DWS refers
repeatedly to these as "new" claims, which they clearly were not - though they were not
set forth in the initial appeal with the same detail that they were set out in the Request for
Reconsideration, they were nevertheless identified and preserved. Apparently, DWS
wishes this Court to construe the grievance and appeal procedure set out at Utah Code
Ann. § 67- 19a-101 et seq. with such precision that, if at any stage of the proceeding, the
grievant fails to lay out with complete particularity each and every argument supporting
each and every grievance, any claim not so preserved "up the chain" is lost forever,
having been "waived". DWS' argument ignores the nature of the grievance process, the
express preservation of the right to request reconsideration, and Judge Lewis' express
order in the 2004 action, from which no appeal has been taken.
On its face, the grievance and appeal procedure set out by the Utah legislature for
Career Service Employees within the state of Utah is quick and informal. While it
permits either self-representation or "assistance by a representative of the employee's
choice to act as an advocate at any level of the grievance procedure" (Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-19a-303(l)(a)), representation by trained legal counsel (with accompanying
precision in pleading and arguing complex claims and theories) is clearly not
contemplated. The first step is completely verbal; if it fails to resolve the issue, a written
grievance must be submitted - within five days. It is followed by a written grievance to
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the agency or division director, which must be submitted within ten days of the
supervisor's decision - Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-402(2). The appeal to CSRB must take
place within ten days after resolution of the prior appeal at the agency or division level Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-402(5).
Given the informal, fast-track nature of the foregoing procedure, it is ironic that
DWS now argues that each step of the procedure must be accompanied by a full "bill of
particulars", laying out every detail of the grievant's concerns. To impose such a standard
would be to place a greater burden of pleading on a public employee than is incumbent on
members of the bar under Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The informal and emerging nature of Mr. Blauer's grievance, moreover, was
clearly understood by his superiors during the grievance process preceding Mr. Blauer's
appeal to CSRB. As noted in DWS Director Raylene Ireland's letter of October 14, 2003
(R. 27-149 at Attachment 26), concerns relating to Mr. Blauer's grievance were largely
presented orally and informally (both during and after a meeting held on September 26,
2003). While Mr. Blauer and his non-lawyer representative, Tom Cantrell, followed the
written grievance procedure mandated by the Act (see Agency's Response in Opposition
to Grievant's Request for Reconsideration, R. 153-275 at Exhibits 4-6), the written record
prior to Mr. Blauer's Request for Reconsideration is not long on particulars.
Nevertheless, Mr. Blauer's appeal to CSRB (R. 13-17) was neither vague nor inadequate.
It included the following claims specified in writing by his representative:
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Lorin's "reassignment" is an unjustified demotion for unsupportable cause.
It violates rules, statutes, and prevailing case law governing discipline,
demotion, dismissal, performance appraisal, the grievance and appeals
procedures, discrimination, harassment, retaliation, etc. It is an ill-disguised
act of discipline without cause. It is punitive, discriminatory, and
retaliatory. . . . It intentionally or callously places a seasoned and successful
Career Service Employee in harms way by forcing him into a situation
which exacerbates known medical conditions creating diagnosable pain and
suffering. It is contrary to his doctor's express advice to the Department. It
is physically and emotionally abusive.
Petitioner, then, did not simply claim that the "reassignment" was "an unjustified
demotion for unsupportable cause". He also claimed that it "violated rules [and] law
governing discipline, demotion, dismissal, performance appraisal, the grievance and
appeals procedures, discrimination, harassment, [and] retaliation..." Petitioner's
representative further established the foundational claim that the reassignment was an
"act of discipline" and that it was "punitive, discriminatory, and retaliatory."
The Request for Reconsideration, though more detailed and formal, was nevertheless
firmly footed on the initial allegations set forth by the Petitioner's non-attorney
representative. No claim was "new".
It was when Mr. Blauer's October 24, 2003, appeal to CSRB was rejected on
jurisdictional grounds that he elected to invoke reconsideration procedures provided by
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. It is instructional to contrast the APA's
language concerning requests for reconsideration with the fast-track, relatively informal
procedure outlined in the grievance and appeals procedure for career service employees:
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Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review by the
agency or by a superior agency under § 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the
order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a
written request for reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific
grounds upon which relief is requested,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a). By definition, a "request for reconsideration" is
addressed to the same court or adjudicative body issuing an initial decision. Union Oil
Co. of California v. State Dept. of Natural Resources, 526 P.2d 1357 (Alaska 1974);
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. New Mexico Environmental Improvement Bd., 97 N.M. 88,
637 P.2d 38 (1981). Simple logic dictates that a request for reconsideration must address,
clarify or amplify specifics not considered by the adjudicative body as part of its initial
decision; otherwise, a request for reconsideration would be an exercise in futility. The
Administrative Procedures Act recognizes the purpose of such a request, calling upon the
grievant to set forth specifics in support of the request.
Petitioner recognizes that his Request for Reconsideration (R. 27-149), contained
more detail than did the written submittals to his superiors within DWS, and to CSRB,
that preceded it. That was its purpose, as contemplated by the Administrative Procedures
Act - to set forth Petitioner's claims with more specifics, and ask CSRB to take a fresh
look at its decision. But it did not invent new claims. That such specifics were not
contained in prior written submittals cannot meaningfully be construed as a "waiver" of
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those claims, given the broad and informal nature of the grievance procedure which went
before, and its fast-track processing.3
Judge Leslie Lewis was clearly in accord. In her Memorandum Decision of
August 16, 2004 in the 2004 Action (R. 576-581), Judge Lewis did not consider the
allegations as "new" claims or unrelated to the original complaint. She, in fact, dismissed
out of hand the very argument urged by DWS here, concluding that "the Court. . . does
not find the Motion to Dismiss to be well-taken .. . Overall, the Court is satisfied that it
has the jurisdiction to consider this matter and that the plaintiff has exhausted his
available administrative remedies." R. 576-581 at pp. 1-2. Consider further that, even
while CSRB was considering DWS' Motion to Dismiss the remanded claims, Petitioner
was pursuing a Motion to Reconsider the Order of Remand, on which the trial court has
yet to rule in the 2004 Action; upon seeing DWS' motion, however, Judge Lewis clearly
expressed surprise at the disrespect with which her remand order was being met. It is
interesting that DWS, so vociferous on the preclusive effect of prior declarations by the
Third District Court, fails even to mention that court's disposition of its argument in this
regard.

3

By definition, a "waiver" is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a
known right - see US Realty 86 Associates v. Security Investment, Ltd., 2002 UT 14, 40
P. 3d 586. This Court should therefore narrowly construe any implied waiver by failure
to itemize particulars at every stage of the grievance procedure.
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CONCLUSION
In contrast to the procedural morass into which this proceeding has metastasized,
Petitioner Lorin Blauer seeks a simple and straight-forward remedy: a hearing on the
merits of the claims remanded by the district court in the 2004 action on their merits,
whether before the Third District Court or before the CSRB. Given that remaining issues
are still pending before the Third District Court in the 2004 action, considerations of
judicial economy dictate a remand to Third District Court for consolidation into the 2004
action, such that all issues may be decided in one proceeding.
DATED this 7th day of September, 2007.
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC

Vincent C. Rampton
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 7th day of September,
2007:
J. Clifford Petersen
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
Kevin C. Timpkin
Acting Chairman
Career Service Review Board
State Office Building, Room 1120
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

808326v1

16

/

J
//
/

